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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Ever since the time of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in North Africa, in the early fifth century A.D., theologians have been wrestling with the problem of original sin. This problem developed in connection with Augustine’s controversy with a British monk, Pelagius. Pelagius had come to Rome teaching and zealously exhorting his fellow Christians to good works. He was especially disturbed about those who endeavored to excuse themselves, when charged with their sins, by the inability of their sinful natures. He was outraged by these excuses and cried,
“Oh, blind madness! We accuse God of a two-fold ignorance, — that He does not know what He has made, nor what He has commanded, — as if forgetting the human weakness of which He is Himself the Author, He has imposed laws on man which he cannot endure.”
Pelagius
“himself tells us that it was his custom, therefore, whenever he had to speak on moral improvement and the conduct of a holy life, to begin by pointing out the power and quality of human nature, and by showing what it was capable of doing. For (he says) he esteemed it of small use to exhort men to do what they deemed impossible: hope must rather be our companion, and all longing and effort die when we despair of attaining.” [1]
Upon hearing Augustine’s prayer — “Give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt” — repeated in his hearing, Pelagius became particularly incensed. The powers of man, he held, were gifts of God; and it was, therefore, a reproach against God as if God had made man weak or evil, to believe that they were insufficient for keeping of His law. Pelagius began to teach and write against this Augustinian view, and when Augustine heard and read these Pelagian teachings, he engaged Pelagius in a lengthy controversy by writing many treatises opposing his teachings.
Although there were many issues involved in this controversy, the basic issue was concerning whether unregenerated man was able to save himself by his meritorious or good works. Augustine denied that man since the fall was able apart from God’s grace not to sin and do good works. Adam’s descendants, he held, were not able to earn salvation by their good works because they had lost their freedom not to sin. Consequently, apart from God’s grace, they were not able to do good works and hence to merit eternal life as a reward for their good works. Only by God’s grace was man enabled to do good works and thus receive the reward of eternal life. Thus eternal life is both a gift and a reward: a gift because only by the grace of God is man enabled to do good works and a reward because these good works merit eternal life as a reward. Augustine wrote:
“If eternal life is rendered to good works, as the Scripture openly declares: ‘Then He shall reward every man according to his works,’ (Matt. 16:27), how can eternal life be a matter of grace, seeing that grace is not rendered to works, but is given gratuitously as the apostle himself tells us: ‘To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt’ (Rom. 4:4)…?
How, then, is eternal life by grace, when it is received from works? … This question then, seems to me to be by no means capable of solution, unless we understand that even those good works of ours, which are recompensed with eternal life, belong to the grace of God … It follows, then, dearly beloved, beyond all doubt, that as your good life is nothing else than God’s grace, so also the eternal life which is the recompense of a good life is the grace of God; moreover, it is given gratuitously, even as that is given gratuitously to which it is given. But that to which it is given is solely and simply grace; this therefore is also that which is given to it, because it is its reward; grace is for grace, as if remuneration for righteousness; in order that it may be true, because it is true, that God ‘shall reward every man according to his works.'” [2]“Nevertheless, since even that eternal life itself, which, it is certain, is given as due to good works, is called by so great an apostle the grace of God, although grace is not rendered to works, but is given freely, it must be confessed without any doubt, that eternal life is called grace for the reason that it is rendered to those merits which grace has conferred upon man.” [3]
Pelagius, on the other hand, affirmed man’s freedom not to sin and to do good works because the denial of human freedom undermined man’s responsibility for his acts. According to Pelagius, by the grace of creation God had given man the freedom not to sin and to do good works. By these man could gain eternal life as a reward for his good works. Thus also for Pelagius eternal life is both a gift and a reward. But the gift was by the grace of creation. Nature and grace are the same. For Augustine, on the other hand, nature and grace are separate and distinct from each other because that which was given to man in creation, the freedom not to sin, was lost by the fall and could be restored only by the special grace of Jesus Christ.
The difference between Augustine and Pelagius concerning nature and grace centered in the doctrine of original sin. Pelagius contended that since nature and grace are the same, the freedom not to sin and to do good works was a gift by the grace of creation. Augustine denied this freedom; man since the fall was not able not to sin (non posse non peccare) apart from the special grace of God. What was given to man in creation was lost by the fall and could only be restored by the special grace of Jesus Christ. Nature and grace are separate and distinct from each other. The natural freedom that was given in creation was lost by the fall, and since the fall, man is not able to do good works apart from the grace of God. Augustine appealed to the doctrine of original sin to support his denial of human freedom not to sin. The whole race, he held, was corrupted in the first or original sin of Adam; from Adam each member of the human race has inherited a sinful nature. By the process of natural generation each individual member of the human race is “tainted with the original sin” of Adam. And because of this inherited sinful nature, man is not able not to sin. The nature that man possesses is the same nature that corrupted itself in Adam. This nature expresses itself in actual sins. The will is an expression of one’s nature, he held. And since human nature is sinful, man sins. Man is not a sinner because he sins but he sins because he is a sinner by nature.
According to this Augustinian doctrine of original sin, which is sometimes called the natural headship theory, not only did the whole human race corrupt itself in the first or original sin of Adam who is the natural head of the human race, but the whole race is guilty of Adam’s sin and has inherited the penalty of that sin, death. In the same way that the whole tribe of the Levites was in Abraham’s loins when he paid tithes to Melchizedek, and thus each Levite paid tithes with him (See Heb. 7:9-10 [4]), each member of the human race was seed in Adam when he sinned, and thus each participated in the first or original sin by “seminal identity.” Because of the organic unity of the race in Adam, his act of sin was the act of every member of the human race, even though they were not conscious of this sin and were not even persons at the time. Following the Latin Vulgate translation of the last clause of Romans 5:12d in quo omnes peccaverunt (“in whom all sinned”), Augustine concluded that because all men literally sinned in Adam, their natural head, they are all guilty and have all inherited the penalty of that sin — physical, spiritual and eternal death. Men are under condemnation not only because of their own personal sins, which each commits as an expression of his sinful nature, but because of the guilt of the original sin in which they participated in Adam before they were born. Thus the Augustinian theory explains the transmission of the first sin by Adam (the original sin) to each member of the human race by the principle of inheritance of sin. By procreation all men have inherited Adam’s guilt and have a sinful nature.
ENDNOTES FOR “STATEMENT OF PROBLEM” SECTION
[1] Benjamin B. Warfield,
“Introductory Essay on Augustin (sic) and the Pelagian Controversy,”
in Philip Schaff,
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church
vol. 5 (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1971), p. xiv.
[2] Augustine, “A Treatise on Grace and Free Will,”
ch. 19-20, in Schaff, pp. 451-452.
See also chapters 6, 13-15, of the same treatise.
[3] Augustine, “A Treatise on Rebuke and Grace,”
chap. 41, in Schaff, pp. 488-489.
[4] All quotations from the Scripture are taken from the Revised Standard Version (RSV, OT – 1952, NT – 1946) of the Holy Bible unless otherwise noted. The following symbols will be used to designate other translations.
| KJV | King James Version, 1611 |
| ARV | American Revised Version, 1901 |
| NAS | New American Standard, 1971 |
| NEB | New English Bible, 1970 |
| NIV | New International Version, 1978 |
| ERS | My own translation from the Greek or Hebrew |
This principle of inheritance of sin as an explanation of the transmission of sin from Adam to his descendants seems to contain a serious inherent weakness; that is, it seems to imply a denial of individual responsibility when examined more closely. The principle of inheritance of sin seems to negate individual responsibility by implying that sin is done by necessity and not by choice. If the will is an expression of one’s nature and that nature was inherited and thus fixed before one is born, then one’s acts are done of necessity. How can a person be held responsible for being a sinner if he was born that way? If it be argued that the principle of inheritance does not involve such a determinism, then how can salvation by meritorous good works be denied? That is, if the sinful nature of the unregenerate sinner does not make it impossible for him to do good works, then he can be saved by his meritorous works. Thus, it seems that free will must be denied, if salvation by good works is to be denied. Thus the principle of inheritance of sin and the doctrine of the sinful nature by denying human free will seems to imply the denial of human responsibility.
Out of this apparent denial of responsibility inherent in the inheritance principle, the problem of original sin arises. How can the transmission of the first or original sin of Adam to each of his descendants be explained and at the same time maintain the responsibility of each of his descendants for the personal sins that each has committed? Thus the Christian theologian seems to be confronted with an apparently irresolvable dilemma. Either the transmission of sin is explained by this principle and responsibility is denied or this principle of explanation of the transmission of sin is abandoned and responsibility maintained.
Scripture everywhere clearly teaches the responsibility of the sinner for his sins. The will is assumed to be free, and each individual is held responsible for his wrong choices.
“31:29 In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge.
31:30 But every one shall die for his own iniquity: everyman that eateth the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge.” (Jer. 31:29-30)
“So then each one of us shall give account of himself to God.” (Rom. 14:12)
Therefore it appears that the first alternative is ruled out. Responsibility can not be denied and at the same time follow Scripture. But then must this principle of explanation of the transmission of sin be abandoned? It appears that it must be, if human responsibility is to be maintained. In fact this is the way that Pelagianism maintained individual responsibility. It denied the transmission of sin from Adam to his descendants. Adam’s sin affected only himself. It is not inherited by the individual members of the human race, neither is his guilt imputed to them. Each man is entirely free to choose right or wrong and thus is totally responsible for those choices. According to Pelagianism, the only effect of Adam’ssin on his posterity is that of bad example. Otherwise, there is no connection between his sin and those of his descendants. Thus does Pelagianism attempt to maintain human responsibility by denying the transmission of sin from Adam to his descendants.
While Pelagianism is scriptural in maintaining human responsibility, it is unscriptural in its denial of any connection between Adam’s sin and those of his posterity outside that of bad example. But Scripture clearly teaches that such a connection does exist.
“For as by the one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man’s obedience many will be made righteous.”
(Rom. 5:19; see also Rom. 5:12 and I Cor. 15:21-22).
Pelagianism, therefore, maintains human responsibility but in an unscriptural manner. For this reason, Pelagianism has been rejected by every major branch of the Christian Church.
Rejecting Pelagianism, how does the Christian theologian maintain the connection between Adam’s sin and those of his descendants and at the same time also maintain human responsibility? Is there a connection between Adam’s sin and the sins of his descendants which will not destroy human freedom and responsibility? Is there an alternative to the principle of inheritance of sin and the doctrine of sinful nature?
A clue to the answer to these questions may possibly be found in the passage of scripture which has been from the time of Augustine onwards regarded as loci classicus for the explanation of the connection between Adam’s sin and the sins of his descendants, Romans 5:12:
“Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, because of which all men sinned: -” (Rom. 5:12 ERS).
Let us examine this passage to see if we can find a clue to the solution to our problem. The first clause of this verse, “through one man sin entered into the world,” is a direct reference to the fall of man by Adam which is recorded in Genesis 3. This act of Adam was the entrance of sin into the world, that is, the human race. The word “entered” implies that sin came from outside of the human race. This external source of sin is, no doubt, Satan. The verse does not say but other Scripture seem to indicate that sin apparently had its ultimate origin in him (John 8:44; compare with Isa. 14:12-14).
What was the nature of Adam’s sin? Was it disobedience, rebellion, or a transgression? It was all of these but something more. It was not merely something negative but something positive. It was idolatry. In Genesis 3:6, the explanation of Adam’s sin is given.
“And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and she gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat.” (Gen. 3:6)
The woman saw it was good for food — she had probably observed this many times before (Gen. 2:9); we have no record that the serpent told her that. She also saw that it was a delight to the eye. She had surely noticed this before also (Gen. 2:9). Neither of these appeals had previously made this fruit a temptation to her. It was the third element that made it a temptation to her: it was a tree to be desired to make one wise. The serpent added this element.
“3:1 Now the serpent was more crafty than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made. And he said to the woman, “Indeed, has God said, ‘You shall not eat from any tree of the garden’?” 3:2 And the woman said to the serpent, “From the fruit of the trees of the garden we may eat; 3:3 but from the fruit of the tree in the middle of the garden, God has said, ‘You shall not eat from it or touch it, lest you die.'” 3:4 And the serpent said to the woman, “You surely shall not die! 3:5 For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.” (Gen. 3:1-5)
The serpent’s temptation contained two lies:
(1) “Indeed, has God said, ‘You shall not eat from any tree of the garden’?” (Gen. 3:1, NAS) and
(2) “You surely shall not die!” (Gen. 3:4, NAS). The first lie attacks God’s goodness indirectly by implying that God makes unreasonable demands. The serpent misstates God’s command. And the woman corrects the serpent’s misstatement but accepts his insinuation that God makes unreasonable demands. This may be the reason she changes God’s command by adding “neither shall you touch it” (Gen. 3:3 RSV). (It is possible that Adam himself may have added this phrase to God’s command when Adam gave it to Eve, to reinforce the command not to eat. The command was given to Adam before Eve was created; see Gen. 2:17-18) This insinuation that God makes unreasonable demands leads to the serpent’s second lie. For if it is unreasonable to forbid touching the fruit, then it is unreasonable to think that she would die if she touched it. The second lie attacks God’s goodness directly by implying that He is untruthful. This second lie is supported by the implication in verse five that God is withholding something good from them:
“For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” (Gen. 3:5 RSV)
These lies are attacks on God’s goodness and love. This is the first element of this satanic temptation: Satan begins with an attack on God’s character. God’s goodness is attacked indirectly and then directly. The second element of this satanic temptation is the offering of a substitute for the true God – a false god, an idol (compare Matt. 4:8-10). Having undermined her faith and confidence in the goodness of God, the serpent offers Eve the knowledge of good and evil as a substitute for God. The third element in this temptation is the presenting of a method to obtain the substitute god. Satan implied that this knowledge of good and evil could be obtained trough the process of eating. This was part of Satan’s strategy. He had to obscure the basic fact that knowledge, moral as well as scientific, is obtained by decision, a choice, an acceptance or rejection. Adam and Eve could have known good and evil by their acceptance of the good (obeying God’s command) and their rejection of the evil (Satan’s temptation to disobey God’s command). Evil may be equally known in its rejection as in its acceptance. Rejection is a far better way to know evil, for one does not have to receive the painful consequences of the choice of evil. The knowledge of good and evil was not something God was trying to keep from them, contrary to Satan’s lie. God was trying to give to them in the only way possible, by decision, by a choice between good and evil. Of course it was necessary for Satan to obscure this fact that knowledge comes by decision. Otherwise there would be no necessity for eating of the fruit of the tree and thus disobeying God.
This satanic temptation was not a temptation to pride; it was a temptation to put wisdom and knowledge in the place of God. Adam’s sin was basically misplaced ultimate allegiance. It was not just unbelief but wrong faith: trust in that which was not God. The technical Biblical term for it is idolatry.
Idolatry is not just the worship of graven images of wood, stone, or metal (Col. 3:5; see also Eph. 5:5). The false gods whose worship is called idolatry are not always so crude or absurd. Many things such as wealth, society, the family, the state, democracy, power, experience, reason and science, which are good in their proper place, may become false gods. These more sophisticated and civilized gods are not so easily identified as gods, but they are none the less gods when they take the place of ultimate allegiance in a man’s life. If anything, they are more dangerous and deceptive because they are not generally identified as gods.
Every man must have a god. By his very constitution man must necessarily have a god to which he can commit and devote himself. This is apparent from an analysis of human freedom. There are three elements in every decision, in every free choice:
1. an agent with the ability to choose,
2. the alternatives to be chosen between,
3. and the criterion by which the choice is made.
It is this third element that is crucial here. Every human decision involves a reference to a criterion in or beyond the self making the decision. That is, behind every choice as to what a man should do and think there is a reason, a criterion for the decision. And the ultimate reason or criterion for any decision, practical or theoretical, must be given in terms of some particular criterion, an ultimate reference or orientation point in or beyond the self or person making the decision. This ultimate criterion is that person’s god. In this sense, every man must have a god, that is, an ultimate criterion of decision. Thus in the very exercise of his freedom, his free will, man shows that he is such a creature that must necessarily have a god. In fact, his every free choice implies this god. This is the unspoken Biblical assumption concerning the nature of man. The Biblical writers would not define man as a rational animal, homo sapiens, but as a religious animal, homo religiosus.
Now the choice of a false god and the consequent personal allegiance and devotion to it is the basic sin. The basic sin is not just negative: unbelief, disobedience, rebellion. It is all of these, but also something positive: idolatry. It is not just a refusal to have the true God, but it is an acceptance of a false god (Rom. 1:21-25).
That idolatry is the basic sin may be clearly seen from the Ten Commandments of the Mosaic law. The first two commandments (Exodus 20:3-6) are about the sin of idolatry and the first two commandments are about this sin because it is the basic sin. Why is idolatry the basic sin? Idolatry is the basic sin because a false god usurps the place of the true God in man’s life. This sin is directly against the true God; it is a direct insult to the true God and an affront to His divine majesty. No more serious sin could be imagined than this one. Since it is the most serious sin, it is also the most basic.
But idolatry is also the basic sin because this sin leads to other sins. It leads to other sins because a person’s god, being his ultimate criterion of decision, ultimately controls the direction and character of a man’s decisions. The choice of a wrong god will lead to other wrong choices. That is, the god to which a person commits and devotes himself will determine the quality of his whole life. It furnishes him with an entire set of values and these values will in turn govern his every specific decision, intellectual and practical. Thus every god stamps its worshippers with its own trademark. In fact the worshipper becomes like the god he worships. As the Psalmist says concerning the idolater,
“135:4 Their idols are silver and gold, the work of men’s hands. 135:5 They have mouths, but do not speak; eyes, but do not see.
135:6 They have ears, but do not hear; noses, but do not smell. 135:7 They have hands, but do not feel; feet, but do not walk; and they do not make a sound in their throat. 135:8 Those who make them are like them; so are all who trust in them.”
(Psa. 135:4-8; see also Psa. 135:15-18)
Since out of the heart are the issues of life (Prov. 4:23), and as a man thinks in his heart, so is he (Prov. 23:7), then what a man has set up in his heart as his god will affect the quality and character of his whole life. It is what a man believes in his heart that determines what he says and does. As Jesus said, “Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks” (Matt. 12:33-35; Luke 6:43-45). Thus if a man sets up an idol in his heart (Ezek. 14:3-5), then out of the heart will come all manner of sins. Jesus recognized this when he declared,
“7:21 For from within, out of the heart of man, come evil thoughts, fornication, theft, murder, adultery, 7:22 coveting, wickedness, deceit, licentiousness, envy, slander, pride, foolishness. 7:23 All these evil things come from within, and they defile a man.”
(Mark 7:21-23; compare Matt. 15:15-20)
Thus if in his heart a man clings to a false god, his actions and speech will show it. In this way also idolatry is the basic sin. In the case of the first man Adam, his sin was the rejection of the true God and the acceptance of knowledge and wisdom, that is, reason, as God. As important and good as these are in their proper place, they are not divine; they are not suspreme or ultimate, they are not God. Adam’s sin is basically an idolatry of reason.
This is essentially what classical Greek philosophy involved, where reason is the universal and necessary. Even though it was a rejection of the popular Homeric polytheistic religion, this does not mean that Greek philosophy is non-religious. “Greek thought did not cease to be religious when it became philosophical.” [1] The interest of the pre-Socratic philosophers was not, or not primarily, scientific but theological. They abandoned the myths of the Homeric poets and rejected the then popular Homeric polytheistic religion, not because these were unscientific but because they presented an unworthy picture of the Divine.
“The Being or Nature which philosophy sought to reach was thought of as a worthier conception of the divine than that presented by the anthropomorphic gods.” [2]
The religious language and concepts of the pre-Socratics are not just relics of the pre-scientific way of thought, not yet outgrown, but the expression of their fundamental religious orientation. As Werner Jaeger says in his Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, “Though philosophy means the death of the old gods, it is itself religion.” [3] And this religion is a religion of reason. This became explicit in the teaching of Socrates. Socrates lived and taught the ultimacy of reason and was executed in 339 B.C. for nothing less than the crime of rationalism – an act of destroying the gods by reason. [4] But he was only substituting for faith in one set of gods faith in another god – reason. Plato was inspired by his teacher Socrates to the same faith. The divine, according to the Greek conception of reality, is that which is not subject to change, decay or death; the gods in Homer are “immortals.” The divine, therefore, cannot be known through the senses because that which is known through the senses is a world characterized by change, decay or death. But since the objects of reason are always and everywhere the same, the divine can be known through reason. This eternal, unchanging realm of the ideas, the objects of reason, is the divine.
“Plato does not hesitate to use religious language of this knowing. He says that both reason in man and the objects of reason are divine, and speaks of the kinship of one with other.” [5]
With this conception of the divine Aristotle is basically in agreement but without the use of the religious language. He says,
“For while thought is held to be the most divine of things observed by us, the question how it must be situated in order to have that character involves difficulties.” [6]
After discussing these difficulties he concludes,
“Therefore it must be of itself that divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things) and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.” [7]
This self-thinking thought is the divine. Thus both Plato and Aristotle held reason to be divine. God is the divine or eternal realm of the ideas in Plato’s philosophy, or he is a self-thinking thought of Aristotle’s philosophy.
According to the Greek thinkers reason is the divine or God. But since the concepts of God and man are correlatives, the Greek concept of man reflects the image of this god. Since reason is god, man viewed in the light of this god, is a rational animal. Reason is the divine part of man. Aristotle says,
“It would seem, too, this (reason) is the true self of every man, since it is the supreme and better part. It will be strange, then, if he should choose not his own life, but some other’s … What is naturally proper to every creature is the highest and pleasantest for him. And so, to man, this will be the life of Reason, since Reason is, in the highest sense, a man’s self.” [8]
This is not the Bibical view of man or God. God is not reason. God is a person (or more accurately, three persons) whose existence is not in His reason but in His unlimited sovereign free decision and will; man is also a person (or more accurately, a unity of spirit [person] and body – see Gen. 2:7) whose existence is also to be found not in his reason but in his limited free decision and will. And since decisions involve a reference to an ultimate criterion beyond the self, a god, the Bibical view of man is that he is a religious animal, a being who must have a god. Reason is not the divine part in man but is a function of the will of the person. To be is to choose, not to think or to know. Knowledge and reason depend upon a prior decision as to what is real.
“…whatever evidence one accepts, whether that of experience or that of logic, will depend upon neither logic or experience alone, but upon a decision by the individual concerned in favor of the one or the other.” [9]
It is upon decision that any knowledge finally depends. Reason is not the ultimate criterion but the sovereign will of the Creator who made all things and has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. This basic incompatibility between the Greek and Biblical view of God and man explains the conflict between Greek philosophy and the Christian faith and the failure of the attempted synthesis of these divergent points of view by Augustine and Aquinas. All attempts to synthesize the classical Greek view of God and man with the Biblical view will fail. Worst of all, the Biblical view of God and man will be obscured and misunderstood.
The sin of the first man was the choice of wisdom and knowledge, reason, as his god. As important and good as reason is in its proper place, it it not supreme or ultimate; it is not God. Adam’s sin is basically an idolatry of reason.
The consequence of Adam’s sin is expressed in the next clause of Romans 5:12b, “and death through sin.” God had given to Adam an explicit command, a proh ibition, the transgression of which would result in death.
“2:16 … And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, ‘You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; 2:17 but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die.'” (Gen. 2:16-17)
At the serpent’s suggestion Eve ate of the tree and gave it to her husband, Adam, who also ate (Gen. 3:6). Thus did Adam transgress God’s command and he died. In what sense did they die that day as a result of their transgression? Obviously they did not die physically. Since they did not die physically that day they must have died spiritually that day. This spiritual death is implied by the Hebrew experssion which is translated “you shall surely die” in Gen. 2:17 and which is literally “dying you shall die.” That they died spiritually is apparent from the fact that they hid themselves from the presence of the God (Gen. 3:8) and later they were driven out of the garden away from the tree of life (Gen. 3:22-24). As physical death is the separation of man’s spirit (person or self) from his body, so spiritual death is separation of man from God. It is the opposite of spiritual life, which is fellowship and communion with God (I John 1:1-3; John 17:3; 5:24; Eph. 2:1). Spiritual death is separation, alienation, from God (Eph. 4:18; Col. 1:21). It is not something wrong inside of man, but a negative or wrong relationship between man and God. Spiritual death is like a barrier or iron curtain between man and God. Death is a power. It is personified in the Scriptures as a king who reigns over the whole human race. Paul says, “by the offense of one, death reigned through the one” (Rom. 5:17; see also Rom. 5:14). Death as a kingly power separates man from God (spiritual death) and brings about eventually the separation of man’s spirit from his body (physical death). Physical death is the outward final expression and natural concomitant of spiritual death (Psa. 88:3-5; Isa. 38:10-19).
The effect of Adam’s transgression on the whole race of Adam’s descendants is expressed in the next clause of Romans 5:12c, “and so death passed unto all men”. Man today, Adam’s posterity, is thus different from Adam himself. As Adam was originally created, he was spiritually alive, walking in fellowship with God. There was no barrier between him and God. But this not true of us, his descendants. We are born spiritually dead and in the process of dying physically. From birth we are in a state of alienation from God. Not because of anything we have done, but because of Adam. Thus
“5:13 sin indeed was in the world before the law was given, but sin is not counted where there is no law. 5:14 Yet death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over those whose sins were not like the transgression of Adam….” (Rom. 5:13-14)
Man is spiritually dead not because of his own sins but because of Adam’s sin. This spiritual death along with physical death was transmitted unto all men from Adam.
Note that Romans 5:12 does not say sin passed unto all men but instead it says that death passed unto all men.
This is the clue to the solution to the problem of original sin. It is death, not sin, that has been transmitted from Adam to his descendants. This verse contradicts the assumption of the principle of inheritance of sin which assumes that it is sin that has passed unto all men from Adam. Paul, however, teaches in this passage that it is death, not sin, that is passed unto all men (See also verses 14 — “death reigned”, verse 15 — “by the trespass of one the many died”, and verse 17 — “by the trespass of the one, death reigned through the one”.) Here then is an alternative to the principle of inheritance of sin: the principle of transmitted death. The connection between Adam’s sin and the sin of his descendants is not the transmission of sin but the transmission of death.
All the other proposed alternatives to the principles of inheritance of sin make this same assumption of the transmission of sin as can be clearly seen from a careful analysis of them. For example, after the Reformation, Protestant Reformed theologians developed the Federal Headship theory, or theory of immediate imputation, to explain Adam’s relationship to the rest of the human race. This theory employs the principle of imputation to explain the transmission of sin. According to this theory, God appointed Adam to be the federal head or legal representative of the whole race. God then entered into a covenant of works with the whole race through Adam as their legal representative. According to the terms of this covenant of works, God promised to bestow eternal life upon Adam and the entire race if he, as federal head, obeyed God. On the other hand, God threatened the punishment of death, that is condemnation and a sinful corrupt nature, upon the whole race if he, as their federal head, disobeyed. Now since Adam sinned, God reckoned his descendants as guilty, under condemnation to eternal death. Adam’s sin is thus imputed to each member of the race as his own guilt. And because of this imputation of guilt, each member of the race has received a sinful or corrupt nature. This sinful nature, which is itself sin, leads invariably to acts of sin. And each man in addition to the racial guilt is also guilty for his own personal sins. Thus men carry a double burden of guilt, of both objective and subjective guilt and condemnation. Thus Protestant Reformed theology explains the transmission of the first sin by Adam to each member of the human race by the principle of imputation. By interpreting the death passed onto whole human race referred to in Rom. 5:12 as the punishment and condemnation for the sin committed by the whole human race in Adam who acted as their federal head and legal representative, the principle of imputation appears to avoid contradicting the Scriptures which say that death, not sin, is passed onto all men ( Rom.5:12c; see also Rom. 5:14-15, 17; I Cor. 15:21-22). But in spite of this exegetical device the principle of imputation still assumes that it is sin which is transmitted from Adam to his descendants. It differs from the principle of physical inheritance of sin only on the method of transmission of the sin. Adam’s sin is imputed to each member of the human race as his own guilt. And because of this imputation of guilt, each member of the human race has received a sinful or corrupt nature. Thus each man sins because of this sinful nature. Thus the principle of imputation also assumes that the connection between Adam’s sin and the sins of his descendants is the transmission of sin from Adam to his descendants.
But this principle of imputation of Adam’s sin to all the human race is not taught anywhere in the Scriptures. It has been asserted that Romans 5:19 teaches this principle of imputation.
“For as by one man’s disobedience many where made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.” (Rom. 5:19)
But the Greek verb kathistemi here translated “made” does not mean “to impute”, that is,”to place on one’s account.” The root meaning of this Greek verb means “to set down”. It occurs 22 times in the New Testament and is never translated “to impute”. It is translated “to appoint” (Acts 6:3); “make ruler” (KJV) or “to put in charge of” (NAS) (Matt. 24:45, 47; 25:21, 23; Luke 12:14, 42, 44; Acts 7:27, 35); “ordain” (KJV) or “appointed” (NAS) (Titus 1:5; Heb. 5:1; 8:3). The KJV translates it “make” six times (Luke 12:14: Acts 7:10; Rom. 5:19 [twice]; Heb. 7:28; II Pet. 1:8). The remaining four occurence are translated variously in KJV (Acts 17:15 “conducted”; Heb. 2:7 “set”; James 3:6; 4:4 “is”). The Greek verb that does means “to impute” is ellogao and it occurs only twice in the New Testament ( Rom. 5:13; Philemon 18), but not in this verse ( Rom. 5:19). There is no support in the New Testament for the principle of imputation as an explanation of the connection between Adam’s sin and the sins of his descendants.
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ENDNOTES FOR “CLUE TO THE SOLUTION” SECTION
[1] Michael B. Foster, Mystery and Philosophy
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1957) p. 32.
[3] Werner Jaeger, Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers
(Oxford: The Claredon Press, 1947), p. 72.
[4] William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy
(New York: Doubleday & Co., 1958), p. 72.
[5] Forster, Mystery and Philosophy, p. 32.
[6] Aristotle Metaphysics, 12. 9. 1074b16, in vol. 8 of
Great Books of the Western World, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), p. 605.
[8] Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 10. 7. 1178a2-7,
quoted in Barrett, Irrational Man, p. 78.
[9] Cherbonnier, “Biblical Metaphysics,” p. 372.