cphil_postaris
GREEK PHILOSOPHY
by Ray Shelton
V. Post-Aristotelian Philosophy (322 B.C.-529 A.D.)
So great was the genius of Plato and Aristotle that the Post-Aristotelian age seems by contrast to be one of decadence. The impression is heightened by the political misfortunes of the Greek states, first weakened by the Peloponnesian war, next subjugated and united in the brief career of Alexander, and then abandoned to a century of miserable decay until Rome moved it. But the philosophy of the period was not so dismal as the general picture. Even when compared with Aristotle there was the originality and vigor of Zeno, Epicurus, Chrysippus, even though we have only fragments and no complete volumes as witnesses of the next two centuries. As the Presocratic period had a dominant interest in cosmology and natural philosophy and Plato and Aristotle had primarily concerned with epistemology, this period was characterized by its practical interest in ethics. This was the beginning of a long period of eight centuries which may be divided into three periods or phases.
1. The first phase or period extends from about the end of the 4th century B.C. to the middle of the 1st century B.C. This period is characterized by the founding of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies, which placed the emphasis on conduct and the attainment of personal happiness, while going back to pre-Socratic thought for the cosmological bases of their systems: Stoicism drawing from the Physics of Heraclitus and Epicureanism from the Atomism of Democritus. They also returned to the Socratic Schools for their ethical ideas and tendencies, the Stoics borrowing from Cynic ethics and the Epicureans from the Cyrenaics. Over against these “dogmatic” systems stands the Skepticism of Pyrrho and his followers, and the skeptical vein in the Middle and New Academies. The interaction between these philosophies led to a certain Eclectism which showed itself in a tendency on the part of the Middle Stoa, the Peripatetic School and Academy to assimilate one another’s doctrines.
2. The second phase extends from about the middle of the 1st century B.C. to the middle of the 3rd century A.D. The Eclectism and Skepticism of the previous period continued into this period, but it was characterized by a return to philosophical “orthodoxy.” Great interest was taken in the founders of the Schools, their lives, works and doctrines; this tendency to philosophical “orthodoxy” is a counterpart to the continuing eclecticism. But the interest in the past was fruitful in scientific investigation especially among the Alexandrians. Over against this scientific interest was tendency to religious mysticism. This tendency was favored by the growing religious consciousness and by the acquaintance with religions from the east. Western philosophers, like the Neo-Pythagoreans, endeavored to incorporate these religious-mystical elements into their speculative system, while eastern thinkers like Philo of Alexandria, tried to systematize their religious views in a philosophical framework.
3. The third phase extends from the middle of the 3rd century A.D. to the middle of 6th century A.D. or, in Alexandria, to the middle of the 7th century. This is the period of Neoplatonism. This was the final speculative effort of Ancient Philosophy which attempted to combine all the valuable elements in the philosophic and religious doctrines of East and West in one comprehensive system. It practically absorbed all the philosophic Schools and dominated philosophical development for a number of centuries. Neoplatonism exercised a great influence on Christian thinking and thinkers such as St. Augustine and the Pseudo-Dionysius.
1. Stoic Philosophy
a. The Stoics divided Logic into Dialectic and Rhetoric, to which they added the Definitions and the Theory of the Criteria of Truth. They reduced the ten Categories of Aristotle to four: the substrate, the essential constitution, the accidental constitution, and the relative accidental constitution. They defined “material” implication and distinguished it from “formal” and other meaning of implication.
b. The Stoics rejected not only the Platonic doctrine of transcendental universal, but also Aristotle’s doctrine of the concrete universal. Only the individual exists and our knowledge is knowledge of particular objects. Thus the Stoics were Empiricists, even Sensationalist, but they also maintained a Rationalism, which was hardly consistent. They held that all men, apparently by reason of common experience, since innateness was not accepted , have a certain basic set of ideas in common, “comon notions.” These ideas provide the starting point of knowledge. They are plural in number and come into play in synkatathesis, or acceptance of propositions as true. They are related to many areas, including our knowledge of an external world.
c. The Stoic physics, which included theology, has been described as either a monism or pantheism. God or Reason (logos) is totally immanent in the world; he permeates and controls every thing and every event. This lead to a strong belief in providence (pronoia), which was often interpreted as fate (heimarmene). Logic as well as physics supports this position. Every proposition, for example, “Scipio will capture Numantia”, is either true or false. If it is true, the event must happen; and if it is false, cannot possibly happen. This position was also supported by the belief in the cyclical character of the natural order, in which each cycle is identical to all the others. This determinism is an ordering of things according to the universal reason or logos which is in control, apparently by reason of a pneuma [spirit] which animates and controls matter. According to the Stoics there are two principles in Reality, the active (to poioun) and the passive (to paschon). But this is not a dualism as we find in Plato, since the active principle is not spiritual but material. In fact it is hardly a dualism at all, since the two principles are both material and together form a one Whole. The passive principle is matter devoid of qualities, while the active principle is immanent Reason or God. The Stoics were materialists, for nothing is real that does not occupy space. They stressed the corporeal nature of things. Following the Heracliteans, they held that fire was the basic element, the stuff of all things. This active fire is God, and is the source from which the other crasser elements, which make up the corporeal world, come forth. The world is the body of God, and God stands to it as the soul to body, being the soul of the world. God therefore, ho Logos, is the Active Principle which contains within itself the active forms of all the things that are to be, these forms being the logoi spermatikoi [“Rational Seeds”]. These “seeds” are the active forms, through the activity of which individual things come into being as the world develops. In connection with their cyclic view of nature the Stoics also developed the notion of world year, a vast cycle of time leading to the periodic destruction of the world by fire. They held that God who formed the world from the primeval fire, will take it back into Himself through a vast universal conflagration, so that there is an unending series of world-constructions and world-destructions. Each new world resembles its predecessor in all particulars, every individual man, for example, occurring in each successive world and performing the identical actions that he had performed in his previous existence. Consistent with belief the Stoics denied human freedom. Liberty or free will meant for them doing consciously, with assent, what one will do in any case. This reign of necessity the Stoics expressed under the concept of Fate (Heimarmene). But Fate is not something different from God and universal reason, nor is it different from Providence (Pronoia) which orders all things for the best. Fate and Providence are but different aspects of God. Since the Stoics held that God orders all things for the best, they had to explain evil in the world or at least to bring it into harmony with their “optimism.” Chrysippus especially undertook to formulate a theodicy, taking as his fundamental tenet the theory that the imperfections of the individual subserve the perfection of the whole. It follows that there is really no evil when looked at sub specie aeternitatis.
d. The Stoics defined virtue as the end or perfection of thing. Man becomes virtuous through knowledge, which enables him to live harmony with nature and thereby achieve a profound sense of happiness (eudaimonia) and freedom from emotion (apathia) which will insulate him the vissitudes of life. In connection with their determinism, they taught resignation or apathia, as the important virtue, and to view this as a reflection of the ultimate reason of things. The Stoic temper differs radically from the Epicurean, giving rise to the English connotations of those adjectives. This may be seen from some of the detailed advice for everyday living. For example, the Stoic wise man will take part in politics (in fact, Stoicism both directly and indirectly contributed to Roman law); he will marry and raise a family; he will not groan under torture, and in general he will suppress emotion as irrational, neither showing pity nor as a magistrate relaxing the penalties fixed by law; and, since one falsehood is just as false as any other, it follows that all sins are equally great, and all men who are not perfectly wise are arrant knaves. However, if life grows too burdensome, he may commit suicide.
a. Zeno (c.335-264 B.C.) [Citium in Cyprus, Athens] founded the Stoic School, which takes it name from the Stoa Poikile, “Painted Porch”, at Athens, where he lectured. It is said that he took his own life. His philosophy was built on the principle that reality is a rational order in which nature is controlled by the laws of Reason, interpreted pantheistically. Zeno divided philosophy into three disciplines: logic, physics, and ethics. Earlier he was a disciple of the Cynic philosopher Crates and his views were oriented toward Cynicism. He was also a disciple of the Megarian Stilpo and of the Academic philosophers Xenocrates and Polemon. Only fragments remain of his principal writings: On the Republic; On Life According to Nature; On Human Nature; On Love; Exhortations.
b. Cleanthes (331-232 B.C.) [Assos, Athens] succeeded Zeno as leader of the School. Only fragments remain, the largest being his Hymn to Zeus. He further divided philosophy into six disciplines: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology. He held that the sun was the abode of God, the seat of the vivifying fire and intelligence of the universe. It is also said that he held that the world is God. He also held that the vitality of the soul after death depends upon its vitality in this life.
c. Chrysippus (281-206 B.C.) [Tarsus in Cilicia, Athens] succeeded Cleanthes as leader of the School in 232 B.C. and remained it leader until 208 B.C. He was called the second founder of the School because he systematized the Stoic doctrines. He is said to have written more than 705 books and was famed for his dialectic, though not for his style of composition. He is credited with creating the Stoic logic, going beyond Aristotle in anticipating the propositional calculus. He regarded God as a material being endowed with reason and extending throughout the universe; he idenified God with fire, and held that in the Heraclitean cycles of the world years all things are consumed into fire, that is, into God, as the cycle comes to its end and the new cycle begins.
This period of Stoic philosophy, which continued the Stoic mainstream during the last two centuries before Christ, introduced some Platonic elements into Stoic teaching.
a. Panaetius (185-110 B.C.) [Rhodes, Rome, Athens] made the most far-reaching contributions by extending the teachings so they could be appropriated by those in public life. He was born in Rhodes and was educated in Pergamum and Athens (where he studied under the skeptic Carneades and others). He taught in Rome, becoming an influential member of the circle of Scipio the Younger. After the death of Scipio he returned to Athens in 129 B.C. to become head of the Stoic School. Cicero drew heavily on his books. The following are his principal writings of which only fragments remain: On Duty; On Providence; On Cheerfulness; On Philosophical Schools.
i. He modified the ancient Stoic cosmology, throwing overboard the Stoic theory of divination, which was maintained on the basis of determinism, rejecting astrology and the doctrines of world-conflagration and of the relative immortality of the soul.
ii. He also modified the ancient Stoic ethics, substituting the more positive value of peace of mind for the Stoic apathia, while stressing the positive role of possessions in obtaining happiness.
iii. He held that the development of human reason implies a universal humanism, transcending our animal nature; and that theoretical reason is less serviceable to man than his practical reason which, in most matters, deserves priority.
iv. He had little sympathy with popular theology. He credited with the following threefold division of theology:
(a) The theology of the poets, which is anthropomorphic and false,
(b) The theology of the philosophers, which is rational and true, but unfitted for popular use,
(c) The theology of the statesmen, which maintains the traditional cult and is indispensable for public education.
b. Posidonius (135-51 B.C.) [Apamea, Rhodes]. He studied under Panaetius, and founded his own school in 97 B.C. in Rhodes where Cicero is said to have studied in 78 B.C. He was a historian and geographer, rationalist and mystic. Binding together the various philosophical currents in the framework of Stoic monism, he tried to support his speculative doctrines by a wealth of empirical knowledge, and infused the whole with the warmth of religious inspiration. Even though his works have all disappeared, through a critical analysis of the literature influenced by him, some idea of the greatness of Posidonius has been acquired.
i. Stoic monism is fundamental to his philosophy. The world is a hierarchy of grades of being, from inorganic entities, as in the mineral kingdom, through plants and animals up to man, and so to the super-organic sphere of the divine, the whole is bound together in one great system and every detail being arranged by Divine Providence. The universal harmony and structural ordering of the universe postulates Absolute Reason, God, at the summit of the hierarchy and as the all-pervading Rational Activity. The world is permeated by a vital force (zotike dunamis) which proceeds from the sun, and God himself is a rational, fiery breathe. He reaffirmed the ancient Stoic doctrine of world-conflagration (ekpurosis).
ii. Though his philosophy is monistic, he admitted a dualism, apparently under the influence of Platonism. There are two divisions of the Cosmos, the sublunar world which is earthly and perishable, and infralunar world, which is heavenly and imperishable and sustains the lower world through forces it imparts. These two worlds are bound together in man, who is the bond (desmos) between them. Man is a microcosm of the macrocosm. Composed of body and spirit, he stands on the boundary line between these two worlds; and as man is the ontological bond, so is the knowledge of man the epistemological bond, binding together in itself all knowledge, knowledge of the heavenly and knowledge of earthly. Moreover, just as man from the corporeal viewpoint is the highest grade, so from the spiritual viewpoint he is the lowest grade. That is, between man and the Supreme Godhead there exist “demons” or higher spiritual beings, who form an intermediate gradation between man and God. Thus the hierarchical character of the universe is uninterrupted, though the dualism remains.
iii. This dualism is emphasized in his psychology, reminiscent of Plato. Following the older Stoics who make the soul a fiery spirit (pneuma), the body is seen to be a hindrance to the soul, impeding the free acquirement of knowledge. He readopted the Platonic theory of the pre-existence of the soul and also reaffirmed the relative immortality of the soul (this is, relative to the body). Although admits the Platonic dualism, he subordinates it to an ultimate monism, influence by the Heraclitean theory of opposition in harmony or unity in difference. In this attempt at a synthesis of dualism and monism he marks a stage on the way to Neoplatonism.
iv. In contrast to Panaetius, he reaffirmed the Stoic theory of divination. Because of the universal harmony of the Cosmos and the reign of Fate, the future can be divined in the present: moreover, the Providence of God would not have withheld from men the means divining future events.
v. Poseidonius propounded a theory of history or of cultural development, in which the philosopher or wise man has the leading role. The current task of the philosopher is that of raising the moral condition of mankind, first of all through practical and political activity and later by self-dedication to a life of speculation (theoria). All these activities are different grades of the same wisdom.
This period of Stoic philosophy, which continued for two centuries after Christ, was predominantly Roman and concentrated almost entirely on ethics. After Marcus Aurelius Stoicism as a distinct school gradually declined into extinction, but some of its features continued to be assimilated into the predominantly Platonic philosophies of both the pagans and Christians.
a. Seneca (3 B.C.-65 A.D.) [Cordoba, Rome] was tutor and minister to the Roman Emperor Nero, and committed suicide at his command. As expected of a Roman, Seneca emphasized the practical side of philosophy, ethics, and within the sphere of ethics he is more concerned with the practice of virtue than with theoretical investigations of nature. He does not seek intellectual knowledge for its own sake, but pursues philosophy as a means to the acquirement of virtue. Philosophy is necessary, but it is to be pursued with a practical end in view. Seneca adheres theoretically to the old Stoic materialism, but in practice he tends to regard God as transcending matter. This tendency to metaphysical dualism was natural consequence of his tendency to psychological dualism. Like the older Stoics he affirms the materiality of the soul, but he speaks in a Platonic strain of the conflict between the soul and body.
b. Epicetus (50-138 A.D.) [Hierapolis, Rome] began his teaching career when he was a slave belonging to Nero’s bodyguard. When he became a freedman, he continued to live in Rome until the Emperor expelled the philosophers from Rome (A.D. 89 or 93). He founded a School at Nicopolis in Epirus and continued as head until his death. Through out his life he was lame and sickly. His student, Flavius Arrianus, took down his teaching, of which most has survived. His principal writings are: Discourses of Epictetus (8 books extant); Encheirdion (a “handbook,” summarizing the doctrines of the Discourses). He insisted that all men have the capacity for virtue and that God has given to all men the means for becoming happy, of becoming men of steadfast character and self-control.
c. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121-180 A.D.) [Rome], Roman Emperor from A.D. 161 to 180, composed the Meditations (in the Greek language) in twelve books in aphoristic form. From an early age he was groomed for rule. His lessons began with rhetoric and poetry. By the time he was 11 he had discovered Stoicism through the philosopher Diognetus. He greatly admired Epicetus and like him and Seneca he gave a religious coloring to his philosophy. He was a devout adherent of the Roman religion, and, finding the Christians guilty of sacrilege, he systematically persecuted them during his reign. Otherwise, during his reign he acted with intelligence, patience, and an attitude very like serenity. He laid stress on Divine Providence.
a. Epicurus established a school in Athens in 306, after having purchased its garden campus for 80 minae. The student body was co-educational and the mode of life was plain. Many ancient writers testify to the crowds attracted by the teaching. His principal writings were: On Nature (in thirty seven books, only fragments of nine are extant); the Canon; and letters to Herodotus, Pitocles, and Memoeccus. Some three hundred works have been attributed to him.
b. Dividing philosophy into the canonical, physics, and ethics, Epicurus meant by the first division something like theory of knowledge. It was treated in the Canon. For Epicurus the appropriate philosophical method is to begin with the clear evidence of sense, “plain facts.” The burden of perception was to accept, refute and shape one’s opinions in terms of the evidence. When opinion falls outside the area of possible perception, one then uses analogy and non-contradiction. Theory is expected to elucidate what is perceived.
c. Drawing from the Atomism of Democritus, he understood reality to be composed of eternal indivisible, qualitatively similar atoms of matter eternally “falling” in empty space. To account for the origin of the world in a mechanistically material universe, Epicurus posited an unexplained swerve in the travel of some atoms and that caused them to strike other atoms unpredictably. This, in turn, caused a swirling movement which resulted in the formation of the physical world and composite things. The swerve of the atoms allow for the freedom of man, and keeps Epicurus from determinism. This chance or indeterminism means that it is not possible to predict the total future. Hence, the future is in some measure open; partly fixed, partly free. The soul and mind are understood as concentrations of fine, swiftly moving of special sorts; the soul atoms exist throughout the body; those allowing rationality are concentrated in the chest. There is no personal immortality, since such atoms require the protection of the body in order to behave in the characteristic ways. He does not deny the existence of the gods but explains them as composed of atoms, as is all else, and existing in perfect bliss in the spaces between the worlds, no more concerned with man than they have reason to be.
d. Epicureanism became famous for its ethical teachings in Hellenistic world. Since there is no life after death, the present life is all a person will have. And since the supernatural beings need not be feared or obeyed, the good life is the one which brings the most pleasure or happiness now. The goal of life is happiness, which is understood to be ataraxia, a state of pleasure enjoyed in tranquillity, free from mental or physical disturbance. However, the wise and prudent person will learn to distinguish between natural desires and unnatural ones. Not only are unnatural desires impossible to satisfy, but they cause negative repercussions in the person who tries to satisfy them. Of the natural desires the one to choose for supreme happiness is the desire for physical and mental repose. Since the greatest disturbers of mental repose are the fear of death and the fear of a supernatural meddling in human affairs, elimination these beliefs through espousal of mechanistic materialism is advantageous.
e. The kind of acts which Epicurus held to be the most pleasure-producing are those characterized by justice, honesty, and simplicity. But the term “Epicurean” as come to be mean profligacy and luxury, the pleasure of the individual – egocentric hedonism. Pleasure and pain are the criteria of the good and the bad: what causes pleasure is good; what causes pain is bad.
f. Epicureanism remained an influential factor in the cultural life of Greece and Rome from the time of Epicurus until to 5th century A.D. During this period there is a long record of the polemic between the Epicureans on the one hand, and the Stoics, Skeptics, the Aristotelians or Peripatetic philosophers on the other.
i. The initial successors of Epicurus, heading the school, were first Hermarchus of Mitylene and then Polystratus. In its early period the school stressed the value theory that pleasure is the highest good, and that ethical theory is derivable form this.
ii. In the 1st century B.C. a number of remarkable philosophers appeared in the movement:
Lucretius [Titus Lucretius Carus] (c.99-55 B.C.) [Rome] was a member of Roman aristocracy. He studied Greek philosophy and especially the writings of Epicurus. He expressed Epicurean philosophy in his poem De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), which had as its chief aim the liberation of men from the fear of the gods and death, leading them to peace of soul. Following Epicurus at most points, he developed a metaphysics built on the concepts of atoms, motion, and the void. Atoms are indestrucible, having size, shape, and weight but no secondary qualities. The different qualities of composite things are due to the difference of the constituent atoms and their arrangements. Matter and space are infinite; hence, there must be an infinite number of worlds coming into being, developing to maturity, and perishing. Atoms are naturally in motion, and this motion, incredibly rapid. is initially downward due to their weight and in parallel lines. The atoms possess the power to swerve slightly from their downward motion. The swerving motion results in the birth of worlds and the appearance of composite things. The same power is used by man in mental decisions. Man’s soul (psyche) has, like everything else, an atomic structure. Hence there is no immortality of the soul, and the fear of death is unreasonable. Man’s sight is explained by a stream of images leaving the surface of things that enter the eyes when the head is appropriately turned toward them. The sense receive the images but sometimes the mind misinterprets the contents received. Our world began from the atomic chaos by the swerving of the atoms which produced its own order. Living forms developed from vegatation into animal forms, and at last into the form of man. The law of survival determined what species continued to exist, and many species have perished. Man advanced from a brutish state in civilization by the growth of natural justice. The Gods exist in the interspace between the worlds, but they are self-sufficient beings that have nothing to do with man. The worlds came to be by natural causes (swerving atoms) and there is no need for a creator. He wrote, “Our starting point will be this principle: Nothing can ever be created by divine power out of nothing.”
Lucretius Garius, T. “The nature of the universe,” in
Theories of the Universe, edited by Milton K. Munitz.
(Glencose, Illinois: Free Press, 1957), p. 43.
3. Philodemus
Philodemus (1st century B.C.) [Gadara, Naples] was born in Syria and studied in Athens under Zeno of Sidon and Demetrius of Laconia. With Siron he headed the Epicurean school in Naples. He engaged in polemic with the Stoics. His principal writing is On Methods of Inference.
4. Asclepiades
Asclepiades (1st or 2nd century B.C.) [Prusa or Chios in Bythinia] was a disciple of Epicurus. Typically Epicurean, he emphasized the role of observation in inference.
5. In This Period
the school stressed it empirical approach to logic, finding the Stoic logic excessively rational. Likewise both the Peripatetic and the Skeptics were criticized for using vacuous, rational arguments.
6. In the 1st Century A.D.
the apostle Paul preached to a group of Epicureans in Athens, emphasizing the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus (Acts 17:16-32). They were evidently not very impressed with what he said to them.
7. In the 2nd and 3rd Centuries A.D.
there was a reversion to the ethical philosophy of the initial period. Two representatives of this period are:
i. Diogenes (2nd and 3rd cent. A.D.) [Ionoanda] As a follower of Epicurus he was interested in Epicureanism as an answer to the fear of death and the gods. He argued against the Stoic doctrine of providence.
ii. Diogenianus (2nd century A.D.) [Heraclea] was a follower of Epicurus and a polemicist against the Stoic philosopher, Chrysippus. Eusebius adopted some his arguments against the Stoic concept of a cosmic destiny.
Just as in the Stoa and in the Garden of Epicurus, theory was subordinated to practice, so in the school of Pyrrho, the founder of Skepticism, though of course with a big difference. Whereas the Stoics and Epicureans looked to science or positive knowledge as a means to peace of soul, the Skeptics sought to attain it by the denial of knowledge, that is, skepticism, the opposite of science.
a. Pyrrho (c. 360-c.270 B.C.) [Elis]
Influenced by Democritus, and by the Megarian dialectic through Bryson who was the son and disciple of Stilpo, Pyrrho developed his own skeptical philosophy, called Pyrrhonism. Diogenes Laertius states that Pyrrho traveled to India with Alexander and there met Indian Gymnosophists whose lives of ascetic solitude he later emulated. He left no writings and his teachings are reported to us by his disciple Timon of Phlius.
i. He taught that human reason cannot penetrate to the inner nature of things; we can only know how things appear to us. The same thing appear differently to different people, and we cannot know which is right. Every statement can be countered by its contradictory, with equally good grounds. We cannot, therefore, be certain of anything and the wise will withhold his judgment.
ii. Since no assertion is more valid than any other, we must submit to an epoche, or suspension of judgment. Since we must suspend judgment even with respect to our ignorance or doubt, we must also preserve aphasis, or a noncommital silence, with respect to all things.
iii. In terms of value the human situation suggests that man withdraw into himself, and reflect an attitude of ataraxia, or imperturbable serenity.
b. Timon (c. 320-230 B.C.) [Phlius, Athens] was a disciple of Pyrrho. Timon composed Silloi, or mocking verses, in which he parodied Homer and Hesiod and made fun of the Greek philosophers, with the exception of Xenophanes and Pyrrho himself. According Timon we can trust neither sense-perception nor reason. We must accordingly suspend all judgment, not allowing ourselves to be caught in any theoretical assertion, and then we shall attain to true ataraxia or tranquillity of soul.
c. Arcesilaus (315-241 B.C.) [Pitane in Aeolia, Athens] He succeeded Crates as head of Academy and became the founder the Second or so-called Middle Academy. In opposition to both Stoicism and Epicureanism he advocated a skepticism that was not so extreme as that of Pyrrho, although despaired of man’s attaining truth. Suspended judgment was to him the best approach. His doctrine of the eulogon held that the guide to life is probability, and that this required adoption of the alternatives supported by sets of mutually supporting reasons. No writings have survived.
d. Carneades (214-129 B.C.) [Cyrene, Athens, Rome] was the founder of the Third Academy in 156 B.C. He stood in opposition to Stoic philosophy, especially its theory of knowledge. The most powerful of the Skeptics, he opposed Chrysippus, while agreeing with Arcesilaus.
i. He held that one is not aware of things, but only of our impressions, and it is not possible to distinguish between true and false impressions. This being so, a wise man will suspend judgment, not even being sure that he can be sure of nothing. But Carneades held that there are degrees of probability:
(a) an impression may be probable in itself (apparently on account of its strength);
(b) probable and uncontradicted (in harmony with one’s other impressions);
(c) probable, uncontradicted, and confirmed.
ii. In opposition to the idea of divine providence, he pointed to the disharmonies of things. So far as the universe is orderly, this can be explained in natural terms.
iii. The idea of God is a tissue of inconsistencies. The attributes of infinity and individuality cannot belong to the same being. Nor can God be either corporeal or incorporeal. If corporeal, God must be simple or composite. If simple, he would be incapable of life and thought; if composite, he could not be indestructible. If incorporeal, God could neither act nor feel. Finally, no assertion of any kind can be made concerning Him.
iv. With respect to uncaused action, Carneades held that such events do not have an antecedent cause in the usual sense; they are caused by the person himself and thus are not literally without a cause.
a. Aenesidemus (fl. 80-40 B.C.) [Knossos in Crete, Alexandria] taught in Alexandria. His principal writing of which only references remain was Pyrrhonic Discourses, in 8 volumes. Reviving Pyrrhonism and systematizing its arguments, he set its form of extreme skepticism against Stoicism and the moderate skepticism of the Academy. He developed ten tropes (Tropoi) or arguments for the skeptical position, showing the contradictory character of experience and the impossibility of certain knowledge, which require suspension of judgment.
b. Sextus Empiricus (2nd & 3rd century A.D.) [Greece, Rome] is one the principle sources for our knowledge of Greek philosophy. In the course of defending Pyrrho and the other Skeptics, he gave the positions and arguments of their opponents as well. His principal writings are: Pyrrhonic Sketches; Against the Dogmatists; Against the Professors; On the Soul (not extant). He presented a set of arguments called “tropes” against the dogmatic position.
i. The first trope argues against the possibility of proving any conclusion syllogistically. The major premise, for example, “All men are mortal,” can be proved only by a complete induction. But the complete induction involves a knowledge of the conclusion, “Socrates is a mortal.” For we cannot say, that all men are mortal unless we already know that Socrates is mortal. The Syllogism is, therefore, an instance of vicious circle.
ii. The second trope concerns causality. He argues against the validity of the idea of Cause. If causality is a relation it is not objective, but subjective, being attributed extrinsically by the mind. And that there are reasons for denying that the cause precedes, occurs at the same time as, or succeeds the effect. It cannot be simultaneous, since the effect might just be the cause. Nor could the cause be prior to its effect, since then it would first exist without relation to its effect, and cause is essentially relative to the effect. Nor could the cause be after the effect, for obvious reasons.
iii. The third trope concerns God: the impossibility of God’s being either finite or infinite. God cannot be finite, because he would be less than perfect. And God is ex hypothesi perfect. On the other hand, God cannot be infinite, for he would then be unchanging and so without life or soul. This trope also argued that the Stoic doctrine of Providence necessarily involves a dilemma. There is much evil and suffering in the world. Now, either God has the will and power to stop this evil and suffering or He has not. If He has not, then He cannot be God, for God by definition is all powerful. Therefore He has the will and power to stop evil and suffering in the world. But this He obviously does not do. It follows that here is at least no universal Providence on the part of God. But we can give no explanation why Divine Providence should extend to this being and not to that. We are forced, therefore, to conclude that there is no Providence on the part of God.